

Changing World and Development of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy

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Abstract

This study investigates the important influence of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Behind the pragmatic strategy of Chinese foreign policy underlying Chinese nationalism, which is appropriated by most of the Chinese people and especially by Communist regime critics. However, some of the Western analysts are estimated negative effect of rising nationalism in China because in modern world nationalism has often resulted in irrational behavior and cause international conflicts. Chinese government considering this situation tries to propose multilateralism in foreign policy, as an effective way for Beijing to increase its regional power. This article seeks answers to two related questions in the context of China's rising nationalism, has the China potential aggressive foreign policy direction influenced by nationalism and supported by its new request of wealth and power? Is China ready to develop multilateralism and find compromise between nationalism and multilateralism and assume international responsibility as a great power? Focusing on Chinese foreign policy after 2008, the article finds that China becomes more pretentious in defense of national interests.

Keywords : Nationalism, Chinese foreign policy, national interests, multipolarity, multilateralism

Introduction

Today Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is the second largest economy in the world and one has experienced incredible growth during the last tree decades. Experts expect that China pass through United States of America (USA) in the next 20 years. According to some of them economic, political and technological growing of the country might be encouraged by nationalistic policy which supported and propogandize by government. Also in recent years nationalism has been one of the most important points in Chinese foreignn policy making. However, the seeming rise of a “new” Chinese nationalism in the 1990s has sparked renewed interests in the subject among scholars eager to understand China’s role in the post-Cold War world. For some, it is a central component of the “China Threat”, providing motivation to purpose a more aggressive foreign policy in order to regain lost territory and status. For instance, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro have asserted that “China’s ambitions are fired by a nationalism of historic aggrievement” that will not only lead China to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, but will result in an eventual conflict with some countries (Brittinham 2007, 147-148). In famous work “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order” Samuel P. Huntington was concerned about China’s plans about bring the end of the century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan (Huntington 1996, 229). Also Edward Friedman, a famous researcher of China, stated that “the new, post-Mao nationalism in China not only challenges Taiwan’s autonomy, it also could endanger peace in the Pacific-Asia region” (Freidman 1997, 5). Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro are agree with this point of view and adding that the driven by nationalist sentiment, and encouraged by revenge for humiliations of the past, and desire to improve an international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia (Bernstein and Munro 1997, 19). This school of thought argues that the current “visceral nationalism” in China is deliberately promoted by the Chinese Communist Pasrt (CCP) to legitimize its continued rule when communist ideology has lost its credibility in the world (Zhang, 108).

While many scholars and researchers thoughts about negative development of Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold War period, this paper will analyze a different points of view about nationalism in China

and its implication to Chinese foreign policy. In the first chapter presents a short definition of nation and nationalism according to Western schools of thought and comparison of definitions from Chinese political theory perspective. Second chapter seeks the sources of Chinese nationalism and try to find out if the country has a potential aggressive foreign policy direction implicated by nationalism, and supported by its new quotient of wealth and power. The last chapter will argue if China ready to develop multilateralism and find compromise between nationalism and multilateralism and assume international responsibility as a great power. Finally, the chapter concludes by focusing on Chinese foreign policy after 2008 and it will try to make some short expeptions about future prospects of Chinese nationalism and its implications in foreign policy.

The Definitions of Nation and Nationalism in the West and in China

The most important point of any branch of science and especially social science is understanding of terminology. Usually accepted definitions of terms in the dicipline are important to understand and discuss scholars' claims about the topic. Among scholars who works on the definitions of "nation" and "nationalism" there is a lot of variations, particularly between Western thought scholars and Eastern. However one believes that nationalism created the idea of nation, and others believes that nations develop the ideas about nationalism. For example Gellner (1983,55) states that "nationalism engenders nations", For Gellner, economic development and modernization create the need for unified knowledge through standardized education. The cultural and linguistic diversity in traditional agrarian societies disintegrates as a result of this educational standardization within the state. The modern and standardized educational system creates social mobility between classes, a homogenous high culture, and thus a common national identity which is imposed and protected by nation-state in order to more smoothly make the transition to a modern, developed economy. The drive to modernize society into the ideal of the nation-state ultimately results in the creation of the nation: thus Gellner arrives at the conclusion that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other way round". According to this view, nationalism and its result – the nation – are functional necessities for economic development (Tang and Darr 2014). While Mellor (1989,5) argues that "every nation has its nationalism", but no one can not discuss nationalism without considering what means by a nation (Barrington 1997, 712). Smith's definition of nation as a "named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991, 14). For him nationalism is derived from pre-modern origins, such as kinship, religion, belief systems, and common historic territories and memories, and is thus defined as "ethnosymbolic" or even "primordial". A common belief in the right to territorial control is central to distinguishing nations from other collectives. Many groups hold common myths, values, and symbols (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups, or even professional associations). But nations are not just unified by culture; they are unified by a sense of purpose: controlling the territory that the members of the group believe to be their. Also, Haas's definition is even more basic: "a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one" (1986, 727). Motyl takes perhaps the strongest stand in defending nationalism as an idea, or, as he puts it, an "ideal". He argues that because nationalism is based on ideas-such as the nation-state, self-determination, national identity, and national superiority actions based on these ideas cannot be the basis for a definition of nationalism, "unless we make the absurd assumption that beliefs invariably translate automatically into behavior" (1992, 311) (Barrington 1997, 713). Finally the constructivist view argues that nationalism is a product of elite manipulation of mass publics. Many authors have noted that national identities are constructed through printed national languages that can connect people speaking different dialects (Tang and Darr, 2014). While certain elements of globalization like mass media, high tecknology, social services are important in the building an idea of nationalism. From Chinese perspective theory of nationalism often does not fit to the general definitions. At first, China was never fully colonized, which sets it apart from most other developing countries, both in East Asian and in other parts of the world. Second, China as a state has inherited the legacy of an empire. In stark contrast to the modal case of nationalism developing as a reaction to the oppression of an empire, China is an empire-turned-nation, or as Lucian Pye has called it, "a civilization pretending to be a nation-state" (Pye 1996, 109). However, each country has a partiquilar history of the building a national identity. A strong tradition in premodern China held that it meant thinking, behaving, and

living in a society in accord with heaven-sanctioned principles exemplifying the best way to be human. Other peoples could learn this Chineseness, and they could also become civilized, but they could never rival China in either defining propriety or drawing people into accordance with it (Link 2015, 25).

After collapse of Chinese empire an idea of nationalism changed and came in two different forms: the state nationalism of Liang Qichao and the ethnic nationalism of Sun Yatsen. Liang's nationalism was a state nationalism, a combination of retrenched culturalism and modern nationalism. His open politics to Western ideas and experiences in later years convinced him that "what we Chinese need most today is an organic integration and forceful order". Liang thought that main nations in China like Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, Miao and Tibetians should unite as a wide nation and as one-third of the world's population, they would occupy a prominent position in the world. China should use nationalism to unite its people, as Western powers had done, to survive in this world. Liang's nationalism also had the Confucian culturalism also rejected culturalism's universalism and replaced it with the concept of nation-state. The revolutionaries and later CCP rejected Liang's cultureism at the turn of the twentieth century.

The second form of nationalism founded by Sun Yatsen, the father the Republic of China (1911-1949), brought a radical ethno-nationalism, calling on Han Chinese to overthrow the Manchu Qing Emperor. Sun Yatsen developed a set of ideas which he later called the Three Principles of the People – nationalism, democracy, and people's prosperity – which became the ideological force behind the 1911 revolution, and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Sun's first principle was nationalism and according to Sun, nationalism was Han Chinese nationalism, which called on the Han Chinese to "recover the state for our own nation... [and] not allow other nations to take away our nation's government". The first priority of Chinese nationalism at that particular time was overthrow the Manchu imperialists, and to build a Chinese state ruled by Han Chinese (Chen 2005, 37).

Sun Yatsen's nationalism didn't disappear after the Republic of China. Also nationalism formed a part of the official discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. However, for reasons which stem from its ideology and from its links with the Communist International, it preferred for a long time the idea of "patriotism" (*aiguozhuyi*) which was supposed to be more easily reconcilable than nationalism properly speaking (which had once been denounced by Mao and his comrades) with the "proletarian internationalism" which the Party claimed to embrace (Cabestan 2005). After the Japanese invasion, Mao Zedong immediately raised the anti-Japanese nationalist banner. During the Anti-Japanese War and then the Civil War against the KMT, Mao wrote that "Chinese Communist must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and patriots..." (Chen 2005, 38).

After collapse of the international communist movement and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Chinese government did not call the idea of patriotism directly into question. The authorities in the People's Republic still today consider as "patriotic" any Chinese person who shows allegiance to the state, renders it service and accepts the directives of the Communist Party, whether they are communist or not. Beijing continues to award this honorary "seal of quality" to many overseas Chinese who have chosen the mainland over Taiwan. However, the idea of nationalism has gradually regained its place in Communist Party discourse, clearing the way for the expression among the intellectual elites of a "new nationalism", more populist and autonomous, which, since the mid-1990s, has gone beyond the bounds of the nationalism set by the Party (Cabestan 2005).

Implications of Chinese Nationalism in Foreign Policy

According to the Chen Zhimin Nationalism in Chinese foreign policy is relatively new and before the twentieth century the main approach in the building Chinese foreign relations was culturalism (Chen 2014). As culturalism fell apart with the intrusion of the Western powers in the nineteenth century, nationalism eventually found its way into the Chinese mind at the dawn of the twentieth century. Thereafter, it became the key driving force of China's handling of foreign relations.

China's traditional culturalism, as envisaged by leading Chinese writers like Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen and Feng Youlan, and analyzed by American scholars such as Joseph Levenson and John K. Fairbank, dominated the Chinese approach to foreign relations for over 2,000 years before the twentieth century (Chen 2005).

This culturalism articulated a clear distinction of a Chinese “Us” and non Chinese “Other”. As the twentieth century Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan observed, “what the Chinese were always concerned about was the continuation and integrity of the Chinese culture and civilization...from the early Qin dynasty onwards, Chinese had clearly made a distinction between the “China”, or “Huaxia”, with the “Barbarians” (Yidi)”. Feng says that “such a distinction was made according to a cultural criteria rather than racial difference” (Feng 1985, 211). James Harrison also pointed out that “the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defined as “culturalism” based on the historical heritage and acceptance of shared values, not as nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-state” (Harrison 1969, 2). From the culturalist point of view, the primary identity of the Chinese was the general acceptance of traditional Chinese culture, namely, the Confucianism that dominated the minds of the Chinese for almost 2,000 years. It is the acceptance, or not, of this culture that separated the Chinese and the “Other”, or the “barbarians” adopted Chinese culture, they became Chinese, and vice versa (Liang 1984, 7).

In defining the Chinese relationship with the “barbarians”, culturalism adopted a view of China-centric universalism (Tianxia Zhuyi). Such a view firstly envisaged a hierarchical world system with China sitting at the center. As the highest developed culture within that system, China saw no other entities that could claim equal status with China (Zhang 2001, 53). The institutional expression of this China-dominated world system was the tributary system that emerged in the Han Dynasty. In this hierarchical system neighboring “barbarian” tribes and kingdoms showed political submission to the Chinese emperors, and in return received material rewards from the Chinese emperors. This Sino-centric universalism was a view mainly about Chinese world order, not about inter-national or inter-state relations. As the line drawn between the Chinese “Us” and non-Chinese “Other” was mainly a cultural construction, inter-cultural relationships constituted the essence of this Chinese world order. Within this world, China did not see herself as one state among others, but as the only civilized entity that had to live with uncivilized “barbarians” to accept the universal Chinese culture. This politics of conversion worked mainly through China’s moral example – though it occasionally employed force. Such a view was a reflection of the isolation of the East Asian international system from the rest of the world before the mid-nineteenth century. For thousands of years, China encountered no other advanced cultures that could pose an effective cultural challenge. Other cultures might be militarily more powerful, and they might conquer the Chinese heartland occasionally. Yet, they had to adopt the Chinese culture when they wanted to rule the vast Chinese population and land. The concepts of nation-state, nationalism and patriotism were never strongly rooted in Chinese thinking. That is why Feng Youlan could write that “the reason underlying the lack of Chinese nationalism was that the Chinese are used to seeing things from a universal perspective” (Feng, 222). Likewise, Liang Qichao argued that, “we Chinese are not by nature an unpatriotic people. The reason Chinese do not know patriotism is because they do not know that China is a state”. Rather, Chinese people tended to regard China as the universe (Liang 1989, 66). This understanding of old sinocentric world effects the world feels aggressive approaches in Chinese nationalism. However, one Suisheng Zhao in his researches about implications of Nationalism in Chinese foreign policy arguing that (Zhao 2014, 535), Chinese government made effective efforts to control nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China’s diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China’s foreign policy.

Chinese nationalism is powered by a narrative of China’s century of shame and humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers and calls for the Chinese government to redeem the past humiliations and take back all “lost territories”. China’s increasingly muscular foreign policy behavior in defense of its

national interests during the recent territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas has fed a roiling sense of anxiety in many political capitals about whether a virulent nationalism has emerged to drive China's foreign policy in a more irrational and inflexible direction and make China's rise anything but peaceful. One scholar suggested that Chinese nationalism took a "geopolitical turn" in 2008, "shaped by many of the ideas that characterized geopolitical thinking in Germany and Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries". Because "the post-2008 hubris have made China's leaders more susceptible to the pressure exerted by this discourse, the string of assertive acts in China's foreign relations since 2008 have viewed with alarm by the United States and others in Asia" (Huges 2011, 601).

Although nationalism has been an important theme in Chinese political discourse for about a century, it has never caused such alarm. Scholars have debated about the foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism after its reemergence in the early 1990s. Taking a side of the debate to cautiously explore the limits of Chinese nationalism and ask if Chinese nationalism was affirmative, assertive or aggressive (He 2007).

Principles of Foreign Policy and Nationalism in China: Multipolarity Discourse

Suisheng Zhao response a question about aggressiveness of Chinese nationalism in implication of Foreign policy as negative, he says that Chinese leaders have followed Deng Xiaoping's instruction to keep a low profile in terms of international politics. China does not try to be a leader for fear of becoming a target of international aggression or interference. Therefore, Chinese nationalism is not a tool for assertiveness and aggression. Zhao asserts that contemporary Chinese leaders have been able to rein in this new sense of popular nationalism. They have replaced ethnic and liberal nationalism with a new pragmatic nationalism in order to gain legitimacy and control of the Communist party. Deng XiaoPing and his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have suppressed ethnic nationalism in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia and have taken affirmative action to assimilate minority groups across the country. The patriotic education campaign of the early 1990s focused on national unity against ethnic separatist movements. Chinese leaders have cautiously encouraged liberal nationalism so long as Chinese citizens to not question the Party's authority. The patriotic campaign held that China was not ready for liberal democracy, and the one-party rule would maintain political stability, a prerequisite for rapid economic development.

This pragmatic nationalism has been dominant in China since the market-oriented economic reforms in the early 1980s. Pragmatism was exemplified best by Deng's "cat theory": "A cat, whether it is white or black, is a good one as long as it is able to catch mice". In other words, the Communist Party would allow certain economic reforms and a loosening of communist ideology in order to preserve the stability of the state. Professor Zhao believes that China's pragmatic nationalism is fundamentally interest-driven, reactive and flexible. China will adopt any foreign policy strategy that ensures peaceful development and peaceful coexistence. The failure of the Soviet Union caused pragmatists to shift from a policy of uni-polarity to multi-polarity. Chinese leaders recognize that China's economic advancement depends heavily on integration with the Western Countries. China has entered the World Trade Organization to accelerate China's business development, maintained territorial integrity by preventing Taiwan from independence announcement, and won the bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing to advertise its stability and success to the international community. Chinese leaders talk tough in foreign relationship affairs, but in reality, they act in a careful and highly calculated manner to avoid confrontation. However, China is often uncompromising and even arrogant when states demand that it adhere to Western views and positions (Zhao 2008).

China portrays itself as a Third World country that pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. "Third World" means that China is a poor, developing country and not part of any power bloc such as that around the United States or the socialist bloc formerly associated with the Soviet Union. "Independence" means that China does not align itself with any other major power. Chinese spokesmen say that their country seeks peace so that it can concentrate on development.

China says its decisions on foreign policy questions derive from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese leadership originally enumerated these principles in 1954 when China, with a communist

government, was trying to reach out to the non-communist countries of Asia. China's alternative design for the world stresses the equal, unfringeable sovereignty of all states large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not. Another Chinese term for such a system is “multipolarity”. The Five Principles explain why America should not be able to impose its values on weaker nations. Thus the core idea behind the Five Principles as interpreted by China today is sovereignty – that one state has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Chinese officials' position on most disputes around the world is that they should be solved by peaceful negotiations. This has been their view on the war between Iran and Iraq, the struggle between Israel and the Arabs, the rivalry between North and South Korea, and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. At the U.N. China often abstains or refrains from voting on resolutions that mandate sanctions or interventions to reverse invasions, end civil wars, or stop terrorism. As a permanent Security Council member China's negative vote would constitute a veto, angering countries who favor intervention. By not voting or casting an abstention, China has allowed several interventions to go ahead without reversing its commitment to non-intervention (Nathan 1997).

China's multipolarity discourse, moreover, actually appears somewhat later than Beijing's practice of regional multilateralism. Although Chinese analysts trace the origins of multipolarity to Mao Zedong's Theory of the Three Worlds, given that the term “multipolarity” (duojihua) only took on its current post-Cold War meaning after Deng Xiaoping advocated it in a speech of March 1990 this view should be treated as a retrospective imposition on the past. It was only after Deng deployed the term in 1990 that it was able to become a formal element of the Party line, included in the work report presented by General Secretary Jiang Zemin to the 14th CCP Congress in October 1992. The inclusion of Deng's speech in the third volume of his *Selected Works*, published in 1993, also made it the key reference point for policy-makers and academics concerned with analysing the foreign policy crises of the late 1990s. Given that China joined the ADB in 1986 and APEC in 1989 and that Jiang Zemin point out in his 1992 work report that it had already established close relationships with 77 groups of states (qishi qi guo jituan), it is doubtful whether multilateralism can be seen as merely a product of multipolarity (Hughes 2005, 120).

Nowadays pragmatic nationalism is adapted to the changing world. It is a national interest driven doctrine, ideologically agnostic, having nothing, or very little, to do with either Marxism or liberalism. The adaptation took shape in Mao's final years with a non-communist strategy of the Three Worlds. Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has envisioned a multipolar community of sovereign nations mutually respecting the principle of non-interference and has worked hard to promote and adapt to the multipolar world against the speculation of a unipolar world. In the process, pragmatic leaders have recognized that the failure of the Soviet Union was largely due to its strategy of confrontation against the US in a competition for the world superpower position that exhausted its economic and military capacity. The author of a popular Chinese book, *China Does not Want to be Mr. No*, suggested that, as one of the weaker poles in the multi-polar world, China should not become the second “Mr. No” following the footsteps of the former Soviet Union to confront the US and exhaust itself. Instead, China should defend its national interest by conducting a shrewd diplomacy, which “requires rationality and calmness” (Shen 1998, 62). Pragmatic adaptation thus seeks to defend China's national interests by making efforts to develop cooperative relations with major powers. Pragmatic nationalists are flexible in tactics, subtle in strategy, and avoided appearing confrontational, although they are uncompromising with foreign demands that involve China's vital interest or trigger historical sensitivities such as the Taiwan independence issue and the territorial disputes with Japan (Zhao 2008, 8-9).

Developing Multilateralism and Internationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy

Chinese policy makers started to develop multilateralism from Deng Xiaoping's period. In the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping began to voice his belief that the developing states of the South were emerging

as an international force for peace and stability that would work on China's benefit and do not venture a main role for China. During the 1980s, regional multilateralism was thus gradually replacing alliances and alignments as a way to improve China's regional influence and promote its national interests without confronting the superpowers, and China's natural support was to come from the developing world. With the foreign policy crises of the 1990s, this movement began to be expressed in a dilemma presented by the task of protecting China's core national interests in somewhat nebulous descriptions of policy towards the United States, such as "some struggle, some peace; struggle but do not break" (you dou you he, dou er bu po). Which means a balance has to be struck between facilitating a stable and peaceful relationship with the US on the one hand, to ensure that US policy continues to serve China's domestic and foreign policies of modernisation and national unification, while Washington also needs to be warned against deploying the methods it used to destroy the Soviet Union at the same time. Central to this strategy is the strategic art of "making people yield without fighting" (bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing), which can foil the US and Western plans to contain China, while still maintaining the strategic partnership for the 21st Century with the US so long as this serves the national interest (Hughes 2005, 119; Chu and Wang 1999: 6).

That the move towards multilateralism in Southeast Asia is designed to protect China's core national interests can also be seen in the way that Beijing deploys what it calls the "New Security Concept" in the region. The genesis of this idea is held to have had close links with the region as Chinese scholars trace its key elements back to the principles contained in the report delivered by China to the 1996 ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures in Tokyo, when the PRC is said to have begun to accept that engaging with multilateral security organisations, formal dialogues and track two dialogues are all ways to protect national security. Such is the origin of the formula that was presented in full as the New Security Concept to the ARF Foreign Minister's conference at Bandar Seri Bagawan on 31 July 2002 (Hughes 2005, 120; Lu, Z. 2003: 56).

While China's use of multilateralism to expand its international influence thus faces the constraints of the extra-ASEAN balance of power, its recent initiatives do show how its leaders have already departed substantially from Deng's principle of not taking a lead in relations with the developing world. Multilateralism is a much safer way to do this than traditional power balancing through alliances against a far more powerful United States. While the changing priorities of international society since the 9.11 Incident have provided new opportunities for a convergence with the ASEAN states, the same can be said of the broader processes of globalization which feature so much in the agreements between ASEAN and China (Hughes 2006, 124). From this perspective, rather than seeing globalisation as displacing a declining multipolarity discourse (Hughes 2005; Johnston 2003: 56), it is probably more accurate to understand it as being brought into Chinese foreign policy rhetoric to complement multilateralism in articulating the kind of power balancing that multipolarity has never been able to provide. When President Jiang Zemin describes the world situation as characterised by political multipolarity, economic globalization on his work report to the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, he was thus juxtaposing two discourses in a way that makes them compatible with the pursuit of China's national interest (Jiang 2002). From Jiang's point of view, the transnational problems of economic integration, the environment, international terrorism and arms proliferation that are addressed jointly by ASEAN and China might be forcing relations between states to be characterised by "constructiveness" "cooperation" and "partnership", but neither side confuses this with the idea that globalization weakens the power of authoritarian states that is so popular in American foreign policy thinking. Instead, the Chinese attitude to globalisation is encapsulated in Jiang's theory of the "Three Represents", a kind of developmental techno-nationalism that offers the prospect of "leap-frogging" the advanced industrial economies and balancing the danger that the United States might use its economic power to gain political control over the world. In fact, if Mao's Three World's Theory is relevant in the global era, so far as China's Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the CCP's Central Policy Research Office are concerned it is in the sense of a struggle against the "information hegemony state" to assert its control over the "information sovereign states" of Japan and Europe and the "information colonial and semi-colonial states" of the South (Hughes 2005; Hughes 2003: 141).

CONCLUSION

With the disappear of the Chinese empire following years nationalism came to the Chinese politics and effects countrie's foreign affairs. And in recent years, nationalism has been one of the key focuses in the study of China's foreign policy.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave birth to a new international system, which exacerbated the problems China already faced. The 80-year long East–West ideological rivalry came to the end, while liberal capitalism and democracy marched into these countries. Although China felt no strong brotherhood with communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after China broke away from the Soviet bloc in the 1960s, the fact that China is the only remaining large communist state inevitably aggravated its sense of ideological in security. This crisis was exacerbated as China aced one of its most serious internal problems. During this period, several Chinese writers started to invoke the concept of nationalism, both in their study of Chinese foreign policy and in their prescriptions for the Chinese foreign policy. Western schools of thought start to debate about Chinese nationalism and world's response to a rising China (Walton 2012).

This “biggest change in the Chinese three thousand years' history” propelled Chinese intellectuals to search for alternative ideas to save China. Nationalism was thus summoned and culturalism was rejected. As Levenson argued, “a culturalism bars foreign ideas, but it may actually invite or not actively oppose foreign material force. Nationalism reverses these relations; it may admit foreign ideas, but it will blaze against foreign material incursions” (Levenson 1959, 110). With the survival of both Chinese culture and world order at stake, nationalism was enlisted as a non-Chinese remedy to the problem of Chinese survival.

In the interview about Chinese Nationalism Yingjir Guo says, the transformation of Chinese national identity is essentially the reconstruction of the Chinese value system or what makes the Chinese Chinese. A process like this is usually ongoing and contested. It may lead to a lack of national cohesion but not dramatic changes or immediate economic and political catastrophes (Walton 2012). According to Chinese representers of political science Chinese nationalism for past two decades, has taken positive approach. This nationalist idea aimes to realize the most important national interests and missions as like economic development, nation-state building, political independence and multipolarity. Those missions are positive because there are adopted to the international cooperation and integration into the global economy.

However, how Chinese nationalism will develop in future depends on China's domestic politics and foreign policies toward China. The rising nationalism and public sentiments against US effected Chinese public and has generated strong angry reaction, but an effective work of Chinese policy makers formulated upon a through understanding of real needs and interests of Chinese people.

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