

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, CHINESE-STYLE: THE CENTRAL ASIAN PROJECTS OF THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK

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ABSTRACT

Global governance underlies the solution of vital problems throughout the world. How can government mechanisms at the national, regional, and global levels promote transformational approaches designed to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability? China's rapid growth in the international arena and its increasing influence are unprecedented. The

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visits to Central and Southeast Asia, has proposed a new strategic vision for trade and investment flows based on a concept of communications embodied in the ancient Silk Road. The BRI has become a powerful platform for economic growth and regional cooperation. Meanwhile, the range of finan-

cial instruments available to developing countries has been expanding with the establishment of new intergovernmental institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This new international financial institution reflects a key change in the architecture of global governance. An analysis of China's contribution to the multilateral system shows its unprecedented growth and commitment to global governance, as written into the country's 13th Five-Year Plan. The principles of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, in turn, provide an agreed and inclusive basis for working out an international political approach to sustainable development with a focus on development cooperation. Global governance offers opportunities for further implementation of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this context, the BRI reflects China's global role as a bridge builder. The BRI

can make a contribution to global governance by suggesting an effective implementation mechanism so as to move towards a more balanced, multipolar, and multilateral international architecture. The BRI's gradual multilateralism will enhance China's legitimacy and prestige. If the BRI builds on the Sustainable Development Goals, this will enhance China's impact and give it additional advantages. Success will depend on concrete actions at the global, regional, national, and subnational levels. In addition, the BRI could be a driver of sustainable development, an effective tool for achieving the SDGs. Acting in harmony with the SDGs, the BRI will be able to promote the common good of participating countries in all areas of development. In this endeavor, regional and multilateral political frameworks are an important step in providing real win-win opportunities.

KEYWORDS: *global governance, China, investment, sustainable development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).*

Introduction

The contribution of emerging economy countries to global governance, as might be expected, has been focused at both the regional and global levels. Apart from the fact that some problems are regional, not global (such as regional trade agreements), while others are global, not regional (such as financial stability or climate change), a coalition to improve governance is easier to create in coordination with existing groups of countries. This has resulted in a complex network of actors, including states and interconnected regional and subregional organizations differing in size, purpose, and mechanism. Some researchers say that the emergence of countries from the global South has led to the advent of a multipolar world and to an increase in the level of political and economic organization in these countries, thereby strengthening the general trend towards a "more regionalized international order."¹ Thus, the role of regional powers and different forms of regional leadership have been discussed as the main drivers of regional transformation.

Although modern China is still considered a developing country, it is already generally recognized as an emerging superpower that plays an increasingly important role in the global arena. The concept of rejuvenation (revival) of the Chinese nation announced by Chinese President Xi

¹ See: J. Garzón, "Multipolarity and the Future of Regionalism: Latin America and Beyond," *GIGA Research Programme: Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations*, 10 January, 2015, available at [www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp264_garzon.pdf], 12 June, 2019.

Jinping in 2013 implies China's growing superiority in economics, international politics, and armed forces.

Today, development of China's geopolitical and geo-economic activity is seen as a priority task. Chinese leaders have recently stepped up their rhetoric on protecting China's national interests and have described the first decades of the 21st century as a "period of strategic opportunity" for China.²

After implementing its strategy of Going Out (Going Global) in world economics and politics, initiated in 2000, China became one of the key and most dynamic global investors. Following the announcement of the BRI, China further increased its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to countries located along the route by 31.5% in 2017, while Chinese global OFDI fell by nearly 20%.³ Thus, investment in BRI-linked infrastructure projects across Asia, Europe, and Africa is expected to amount to \$8 trillion.⁴ Data analyzed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) show that in 2014-2017 major Chinese banks invested \$102.6 billion in the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors of the BRI countries, while \$25.7 billion went into electric power generation and transmission, and \$12.4 billion into transportation.⁵ Thus, China's national interests, like its investments, are "going out" beyond its national boundaries. As China's role in the international arena increases, there is a redistribution of spheres of influence between China and existing global players.

Sustainable Development and the BRI

The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019 ended with the adoption by more than 60 participating countries and organizations of a Joint Communiqué entitled "Belt and Road Cooperation: Shaping a Brighter Shared Future." An orientation towards sustainable development and a new type of international relations was clearly evident in the statements and official documents of the leaders of these countries. The Joint Communiqué repeatedly mentioned their resolve "to achieve sustainable development in its three dimensions—economic, social and environmental—in a balanced and integrated manner."⁶ Since 1994, when China presented its national Agenda 21 (an agenda for the 21st century), sustainable development has become a government slogan in different areas, such as family planning, the fight against poverty, healthcare, protection of the environment by water protection, control of pollution, solid waste reduction, rational natural resource management, prevention of natural disasters, renewable energy sources, and urbanization. In order to achieve these goals, in 2000 China established a reorganized leading group for promoting sustainable development projects. The Chinese government has also published a document presenting its position on sustainable development and reaffirming its commitment to "following the road of mutual benefit,

² Xu Jian, "Rethinking China's Period of Strategic Opportunity," *CIIS*, 28 May, 2014, available at [http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-05/28/content_6942258.htm], 12 June, 2019.

³ See: Lihuan Zhou, S. Gilbert, Ye Wang, C. Muñoz, K. Gallagher, "Moving the Green Belt and Road Initiative: From Words to Actions," available at [<https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/11/GDP-and-WRI-BRI-MovingtheGreenbelt.pdf>], 12 June, 2019.

⁴ See: Cheang Ming, "China's Mammoth Belt and Road Initiative Could Increase Debt Risk for 8 Countries," available at [<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/05/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-raises-debt-risks-in-8-nations.html>], 12 June, 2019.

⁵ See: L. Zhou, S. Gilbert, Y. Wang, C. Muñoz, K. Gallagher, *op. cit.*

⁶ *Joint Communiqué of the Leaders' Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation*, 27 April, 2019, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, available at [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1658766.shtml], 12 June, 2019.

win-win cooperation and common development” and working with other countries “to contribute to the construction of a community of shared destiny.”⁷

As a large-scale project of the 21st century that spans across three continents, the BRI should also transition to a long-term model of sustainable development. The sustainable development concept was a logical transition to the greening of scientific knowledge and socio-economic development, an approach that took hold and expanded rapidly in the 1970s, when humanity had to address global environmental challenges.⁸ A response to this problem was the creation of international non-governmental research organizations to study global processes on the Earth. The main goal of sustainable development in the sphere of ecology is to ensure the stability of physical and ecological systems.⁹ Environmental protection is seen as part of the long-term process of sustainable human development.¹⁰ Although the Belt and Road Initiative focuses on economic development, particularly infrastructure projects, it can also make a big contribution to the process of sustainable development, including when it comes to the environment.

Since the BRI mainly involves developing countries, in the past few decades they have focused on economic growth, particularly on increasing GDP. But this approach has not solved the problem of inclusive development. Moreover, these economic models have shown their weakness in achieving social, gender, regional, and ecological balance.¹¹ BRI projects provide opportunities for implementing sustainable development practices, because recently published documents and other statements on this concept speak of “green finance,” community development, and environmental protection along the BRI routes.¹² For example, a document entitled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” calls for “diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development” in the countries involved. The BRI has the potential to contribute to China’s development for many reasons.

- First, by linking the power plants of its eastern coastal regions with the rich resources of its western regions, as well as with all Eurasian regions, China can achieve steady progress and stabilize energy consumption and demand in the country, for example, by producing cleaner gas and developing renewable energy sources.¹³
- Second, the BRI intends to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe by modern communication lines. At the Belt and Road Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke of connectivity centered on major infrastructure projects, such as the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, including their telecommunications networks, railways, and pipeline systems. These corridors connect

⁷ *China’s Position Paper on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, available at [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1357701.shtml], 12 June, 2019.

⁸ See: J. Cogburn, D. Rahm, *Government Green Procurement in the U.S.: An Approach to Meeting Global Environmental Challenges*, Routledge, New York, 2007, 616 pp.

⁹ See: D. Griggs, M. Smith, J. Rockström, M. Öhman, O. Gaffney, G. Glaser, N. Kanie, I. Noble, S. Will, P. Shyam-sundar, “An Integrated Framework for Sustainable Development Goals,” *Ecology and Society*, Vol. 19, Issue 49, 2014.

¹⁰ See: H. Daly, “Sustainable Development: From Concept and Theory to Operational Principles,” *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 16, 1990.

¹¹ See: Li-jun Xu, Xiao-chao Fan, Wei-qing Wang, Lei Xu, You-lian Duan, Rui-jing Shi, “Renewable and Sustainable Energy of Xinjiang and Development Strategy of Node Areas in the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’,” *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, Vol. 79, 2017.

¹² See: Liu Qin, “China Needs to Pave ‘One Belt One Road’ with Green Finance,” available at [<https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8532-China-needs-to-pave-One-Belt-One-Road-with-green-finance-say-experts>], 12 June, 2019.

¹³ See: Yunyang Liu, Yu Hao, “The Dynamic Links between CO2 Emissions, Energy Consumption and Economic Development in the Countries along ‘the Belt and Road’,” *Science of the Total Environment*, Vol. 645, 2018.

rapidly growing regions with relatively backward ones, providing opportunities to reduce economic disparities and thus helping to achieve one of the goals of sustainable economic development. In addition, Beijing has followed a policy of combining BRI projects with the local policies of the participating countries: it cooperates with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where Russia plays the leading role; Kazakhstan's state program Nurly Zhol (Bright Path); and the Steppe Road program in Mongolia, thus creating a ramified multimodal transport system.

- Third, the BRI has an opportunity to support globalization through infrastructure projects and to integrate various aspects of production, consumption, and distribution in the coming decades, thus helping to mitigate and overcome current financial crises and, possibly, to foster new diversified economic development models differing from current, export-oriented ones. Within the country, China has switched from an export orientation to domestic consumption during the 12th and 13th five-year periods.
- Fourth, "low-carbon" investments in concrete infrastructure and environmental protection projects could provide an alternative to the current trend to invest in environmentally harmful projects. The Forum participants have reportedly signed 283 agreements worth a total of more than \$64 billion, but the list of these projects has not yet been published. Thus, we cannot say whether these are mostly green investment sectors.
- And fifth, the BRI suggests improving urban development through smart cities. This can integrate various industrial, transport, energy, environmental, and sustainable development projects over the long term. In addressing the environmental problems of regions, China also plans to use the excess capacity created in the recent period of reform and openness.

The Forum reviewed the implementation of the BRI from 2015, that is, from the adoption of its action plan. Much attention was paid to the ideas of anti-protectionism and global welfare for all. Based on the argument that in the period from 2014 to 2016 (right after the announcement of the BRI) Chinese trade with BRI countries exceeded \$3 trillion, China launched an initiative on unimpeded trade between the BRI countries. The development of trade and investment in BRI regions can promote the economic connectivity of continents and lead to more sustainable development practices. It was pointed out that simplified trade and investment rules within the BRI framework had reduced customs clearance time for agricultural products from Central Asian countries to China by 90%;¹⁴ that 56 economic and trade cooperation zones with 180,000 jobs had been established in BRI countries; that Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank loans to BRI countries amounted to \$1.7 billion; and that China's total investments in BRI countries amounted to \$50 billion.¹⁵

Clearly, China wants to position itself as a trendsetter in modern international relations and a promoter of global sustainable development. Moreover, China is already seen as the architect of a new type of international relations based on transparency without blocs, plurality of political systems, and the concept of integrated security. It is obvious that the large-scale Belt and Road Forum has become a platform where China presents its vision of global governance, increasingly integrating it with sustainable development goals and objectives. Thus, China is seeking to prove the consistency and legitimacy of the monumental BRI project, which, in its opinion, not only develops the new multimodal infrastructure network, but also makes a significant contribution to the development of education, environmental protection, and cultural dialog between the BRI countries.

¹⁴ See: *The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects 2019*. Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, available at [www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/TheBeltandRoadInitiativeProgressContributionsandProspects.docx], 6 November, 2019

¹⁵ See: "What to expect from Belt and Road Forum," available at [http://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/05/01/content_281475642425749.htm], 12 June, 2019.

The AIIB in Central Asia

For many years, China's leaders have argued that international financial institutions have been unable to come to terms with China's rising prominence in the world economy.¹⁶ Although recent reforms have helped to increase China's contribution and voting power in the global market, China is still underrepresented in global economic governance relative to its weight in the global economy.¹⁷ Since the beginning of market reforms in the late 1970s, China's GDP has grown at an average rate of 10% per year, and today it is the world's second largest economy after the United States. The establishment of the AIIB was part of the reorientation of Chinese foreign and international economic policy that began when Xi Jinping came to power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012 and then as President of China in 2013.¹⁸

The initiative to create the AIIB was launched by President Xi Jinping in October 2013. This regional multilateral development institution is based on the model and principles of a multilateral bank and aims to support infrastructure construction in developing countries. On 24 October, 2014, the finance ministers and authorized representatives of 21 founding countries, including China, India, and Singapore, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on establishing the AIIB. The Bank's Articles of Agreement were signed on 29 June, 2015, at a ceremony attended by the finance ministers and representatives of 57 prospective founding members, including 37 Asian and 20 non-regional countries. The AIIB was officially formed on 25 December 2015, when the Articles of Agreement entered into force. The list of member countries soon expanded, as AIIB President Jin Liqun announced that more than 20 countries had applied to join the Bank and that in 2017 the number of member countries could reach 90. The AIIB is the first multilateral financial institution created at China's initiative. The Bank officially opened for business in January 2016, when its Board of Governors and Board of Directors held their inaugural meetings.

The creation of the AIIB has led to the development of joint projects between China and Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Since it was Beijing that initiated its establishment and largely controls its activities, the Bank's principles and policy are considered in the context of China's global and regional goals. The AIIB is a mechanism for implementing Chinese investment projects in Central Asia. Having joined the Bank, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia have accepted its principles.

The initial stage of its activity in Central Asia correlates with the first agreements on the relocation of some Chinese industrial facilities to CA countries. Through the AIIB, Beijing competes for regional influence with Russia, the United States, Japan, India, and the European Union, which have pursued an active regional policy through multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank (WB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Thus, Russia has promoted its integration policy in the region mainly through the EAEU, while China uses the AIIB. Although the Central Asian countries can benefit from this situation by choosing the best conditions, the emergence of economic contradictions and conflicts between Russia, China, the United States, and other competitors operating in the region cannot be ruled out. The gradual institutionalization of the AIIB shapes China's

¹⁶ See: "China's Calls for Reform at the World Bank, IMF and ADB Cannot Be Ignored Any Longer," *South China Morning Post*, 12 September, 2016, available at [<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2018461/chinas-calls-reform-world-bank-imf-and-adb-cannot-be-ignored>], 12 June, 2019.

¹⁷ See: A. He, *The Dragon's Footprints: China in the Global Economic Governance System*, McGill-Queens University Press, Ontario, 2016, 320 pp.

¹⁸ See: W. Morrison, "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States," available at [https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.kz/&httpsredir=1&article=2323&context=key_workplace], 12 June, 2019.

economic policy in Central Asia, making it more structural, active and unilateral so as to serve Beijing's interests.¹⁹

The Bank's authorized capital stock is \$100 billion, divided into 1 million shares with a par value of \$100,000 per share. China's subscription amounts to \$29,780.4 billion, which gives it 26.6% of total votes.²⁰ The second largest participant is India with 7.51% of votes, followed by Russia with 5.93%. The voting power of Central Asian countries is as follows: Kazakhstan has 0.89% of the total, Uzbekistan 0.45%, Tajikistan 0.29%, and Kyrgyzstan 0.29%. On 25 June, 2016, AIIB President Jin Liqun reported that the Bank's Board of Directors had approved the first four loan projects in the field of energy, transport, and urban development in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan totaling \$509 million. These include a joint AIIB-EBRD border road improvement project in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan worth a total of \$105.9 million (with the EBRD contributing \$62.5 million); an AIIB loan of \$100 million for the National Motorway M-4 (Shorkot-Khanewal Section) project in Pakistan; a \$165 million loan to upgrade and expand the power distribution network in Bangladesh; and a \$216.5 million loan for a slum-upgrading project in Indonesia. At the Beijing Forum on 4 November, 2016, Jin Liqun said that the Bank had approved financing for nine projects worth a total of \$1.7 billion: the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline project (Azerbaijan); the Duqm Port Commercial Terminal project and a railway project (Oman) and others. All projects financed by the Bank are located in Asia, and most of them relate to the development of infrastructure, energy, and transport. According to the AIIB president, the Bank intends to gradually expand the scope of its work, aiming to increase annual loan amounts to \$10-15 billion in the next five or six years.

While deepening economic relations with neighboring countries under the BRI Initiative, China has also intensified its cooperation with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional development banks in order to reform the governance and functioning of these institutions taking into account China's increased economic influence in the global economy.²¹ The BRI Initiative and the AIIB have been working together to develop infrastructure construction in the countries involved. Overproduction is a problem of the modern Chinese economy. Since China has passed the active phase of infrastructure modernization, its production economy needs new projects to maintain employment levels for workers and production at plants outside the country. In building infrastructure for the BRI Initiative, it is important to move the "huge building site" from China to Asian countries, particularly to Central Asia. The AIIB is the main mechanism for financing these projects. In the past, China suggested establishing a bank and a free trade area within the SCO, but other participants did not support the initiative. So, China has found an alternative solution for such cooperation. The road improvement project on the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will enhance connectivity along the Tajikistan segment of the Asian Highway Network and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridor 3 (CAREC Corridor 3). The project road—the last missing section of the Asian Highway Network and CAREC Corridor 3 in Tajikistan territory—was built 30 years ago and is currently in poor technical condition. The project will help to increase national and regional trade, reduce traffic congestion, and improve road safety. It has a road rehabilitation and reconstruc-

¹⁹ See: K. Muratshina, "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Post-Soviet Central Asia: New Multilateral Bank Formation in the Context of China's Economic Interaction with Post-Soviet Central Asian Countries," *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, No. 3, 2017, pp. 84-106.

²⁰ See: He Jia, Chong Yatu, "The AIIB First Successes," *Silk Road-Review*, No. 3, 2017, pp. 8-15.

²¹ See: Hongying Wang, "From 'Taoguang Yanghui' to 'Yousuo Zuowei': China's Engagement in Financial Minilateralism," available at [<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/taoguang-yanghui-yousuo-zuowei-chinas-engagement-financial-minilateralism>], 12 June, 2019 (see also: idem, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China's Foray into Global Economic Governance," available at [<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-016-0043-x>], 12 June, 2019).

tion component, as well as a consultancy service component to provide construction supervision. The detailed engineering design for the roadwork component has been completed. The scope of work includes:

- (1) Building a 3-level traffic interchange and related pedestrian underpasses at 82nd Roundabout.
- (2) Building a 3-level traffic interchange at Avicenna Roundabout.
- (3) Building two 2-level traffic interchanges at key local road crossings.
- (4) Widening the project road to dual 4 lanes.
- (5) Improving adjacent intersecting roads.
- (6) Reconstructing pavements.
- (7) Building several pedestrian underpasses.

The Ministry of Transport of Tajikistan is the project executing agency. The project implementation period is from December 2016 to December 2020. Improving the Dushanbe-Uzbekistan border road is essential to promoting economic growth in Tajikistan and trade in Central Asia. The Project will help to increase national and regional trade, reduce traffic congestion, and improve road safety.²² New financing will help Tajikistan to upgrade a section of the road in the capital, Dushanbe, between the Avicenna Monument and the Western Gate, including the 82nd and Avicenna roundabouts.²³ This road, which provides a direct connection between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, is one of the most important international roads requiring urgent reconstruction.

Conclusion

The growth of developing countries, such as China, shows that policy and international collective decision-making mechanisms cannot keep pace with global changes. The creation of a fair and inclusive global governance system will improve the international environment and strengthen the global partnership for development in many respects.

The 2030 Agenda uses a comprehensive and sustainable approach to inclusive growth in all regions.

The AIIB is an important tool for increasing China's international influence and implementing its economic strategy in the Central Asian countries involved in the BRI project. Clearly, China needs to diversify the supply routes for its goods that lead to Europe and other regions by developing infrastructure in landlocked Central Asia. It is obvious that China and the AIIB are currently the main investors in Central Asian infrastructure. While increasing investment in Central Asian countries, AIIB membership also leads to a certain increase in debt, thus causing concern among the local political elite and the population, as well as makes it impossible to insist on state priorities and partnership plans. The Chinese economy has long gone beyond the regional boundaries, which is why large-scale infrastructure construction in Central Asia benefits China and serves its long-term interests, generating interest income and offers to Chinese equipment manufacturers and construction compa-

²² See: "Tajikistan: Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement Project," available at [<https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/2016/tajikistan-border-road.html>], 12 June, 2019.

²³ See: S. Pyrkalo, "Road Project in Tajikistan Becomes First Joint EBRD-AIIB Investment," available at [<http://www.ebrd.com/news/2016/road-project-in-tajikistan-becomes-first-joint-ebrdaiib-investment.html>], 12 June, 2019.

nies. For China, this is also important from the perspective of implementing the Silk Road Economic Belt project, while for the CA countries this is an opportunity to upgrade their infrastructure and expand their international ties and routes. Since the launch of the AIIB, China's international competition for influence in Central Asia has been intensifying. Another priority for Beijing in its relations with post-Soviet Central Asia is a partial relocation of its industrial facilities and lease of agricultural land in the region. Owing to China's large share of capital stock and its leadership in AIIB governance, it can support such initiatives. As for expectations from the AIIB, the priorities of post-Soviet CA states and China differ: Beijing attaches primary importance to infrastructure projects, while the CA countries are generally in need of investment in both infrastructure and production.

Clearly, China wants to position itself as a trendsetter in modern international relations and a promoter of global sustainable development. Moreover, China is already seen as the architect of a new type of international relations based on transparency without blocs, plurality of political systems, and the concept of integrated security. It is obvious that the large-scale Belt and Road Forum has become a platform where China presents its vision of global governance, increasingly integrating it with sustainable development goals and objectives. Thus, China is seeking to prove the consistency and legitimacy of the monumental BRI project, which, in its opinion, not only develops the new multimodal infrastructure network, but also makes a significant contribution to the development of education, environmental protection, and cultural dialog between the BRI countries.
